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The emotionally charged words of the title of this paper suggest 
its polemrcal character Perhaps rt is in order for an a田demic
ec叩 omistto justify an article of this聞社.Mo耽 mode叩 economists
profess to be scientific. They feel most secure when they report on 
analyses of models they have created Although not always relevant 
to the actual situation, theoretical models have the advantage of 
possessing characteristics which the analyst田ncontrol. 
There is, however, a long and worthy t回.diticnof economic writ-
fogs that discuss issues that a問 highlyrelevant to the the crucial 
problems of their trme and which take positio回目1these issues 
which are clearly of a polemical character. Thus Adam Smith 
p旧blishedhis WEALTH OF NATIONS largely as a vigorous attack 
on what he considered unwarranted and unwise governm四 tregula-
tmn of fo民 ign廿adeand of domestic economic凹hey He coined 
the term“M町田ntrhsm＇’ tocharacterize this system which had 
dominated Europ田necomomc and p0Ht1cal practice五orthe p目 vious
two or three centuries. And he did not hesitate ta say what he 
thought was wrong with the accepted doctrines of Mercant1lism 
Karl Marx is regarded by立国nyeconomists as not a highly original 
economic theorist " Rather he is noted as one who applied with 
relentless logic the accepted economic thought of his day. His pur-
po配 clearlywas n此 just旬田gagem f叫rledぬa匝 but 目ther旬
point the way to a r田 rganizationof the whole capitalist system. 
1) See, e g, Barbara Ward, INDIA AND THE WEST, Landon, Hami~h → 
Hamiltan, 1961, p. 53. 
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Anyone who is not convinced that the late Lord Keynes was a 
polemicist should read his ECNOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE 
PEACE," or better stil his ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF 
MR. CHURCHILL." But even bis more scholarly GENERAL THE 
ORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND MONEY" is essen-
tially a cnt1que of the failures of the fmance mimsters of bis day 
to understand the levels of governmental receipts and expenditures. 
reqmste for an adequate level of aggregate demand. And Lord 
Keynes was always willing and田gerto advise the British Treasury 
concerning the concrete policies they should follow. If this present 
article can be only a whisper in the continuing trad1t10n of these 
thundering w1ces of tbe p田L I will consider my efforts amply 
rewarded. 
In August 1972 I returned to Japan after 16 y回目 ofabsence. A 
defeated nation then, Japan has now emerged as the third greatest 
of the world’s economic giants. The Japanese economy is unparal 
leled for its ability to sustam a remarkably high level of economic 
growth for an unusually long period of time. But to me as an 
economist the most stnkmg change I noted was not the ubiquitous. 
color TVs, the air conditioners, and the automobiles I回wevery-
where. Rather it was the phenomenal change m the position of 
the United States dollar. In 1956 the most stirring issues of inter-
national mone恒ryrelationships was the“world-wide dallar shor也氏J’
The Japanese (along with the countries of Western Europe〕con
sidered the Am町icandollar to be the hardest and国 festof all 
currencies. The dollar was as good as gold even better because 
the dollar could田man mterest income wher田sgold was only an 
expense to store. The only debatable issue about the dollar then 
was whether the dollar shor担gecould be ameliorated by suitable 
2〕 London,Macm1llan, 1919. 
3〕 London,L. and V. Woolf, 1925 Also published in ESSAYS IN 
PERSUASION, New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1932. 
4〕 London,Macmillan, 1936. 
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.adjustments of e況changerates, or whether the dollar shortage was 
a 九truetu四l”one justifying the continuance of rigid exchange 
controls and other import restrictions on American exports. What 
a change 16 years had effected ! By 1972 the almighty dollar had 
already been devalued once ("debased”was the word we used when 
we were more honest about it). According to the Smithsonian 
agreement of December 1971 the dollar was devalued by 16目88%vis・ 
a ・vis the yen.的 Inmid-February 1973 the dollar tumbled agam. 
A formal American devaluation of 10% was accompamed by a宜oat
・of the yen which forecast an aggregate devaluation of from 16 to 20 
per cent below the rate of the Smithson阻nagreement. Why has there 
be田町 thisd四sticchange in the international pos1t10n of the dollar? 
Probably the most important smgle factor has been the striking 
post-war recovery m the economies of Western Europe and of 
Japan. Although the costs of hving in these co旧ntrieshave in gen・ 
era! indicated a rate of in自at10nhigher than that of the United 
States」theprices of their export products have not risen correspon-
dingly." As a result of these relative price changes, the enormous 
United S祖tessurpl旧sin its merchandise trade balance fel sharply 
as the de回1deof the 1960s advanced so that it had practically 
disappeared by the end of the de回 de. It had actually changed to 
a merchandise trade deficit of n田 rly$3 b111ion m 1971 and to a 
muぬ largerdeficit of S6. 3 biJlion in 1972. In fact, It was probably 
the announcement by the United States Department of Commerce 
of the size of the fourth quarter 1972 merchandise trade def1c1t 
which touched off the畳urryof speculative pressure agamst the 
5〕 JNTERNTIONALFINANCIAL NEWS SURVEY，“Ag回ement on 
International Monetary Arrangements，” December 22-30, 1971, p. 421 
6) INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATISTICS published by the Inter-
national Monetary Fund indicate that in 出eUnited States the cons旧－
mer price inde況 advancedby 32% in the decade betwee汎 1960and 
1970. The United States mdex of export p口cesadvanced by 23%ー On
the other hand, Japan had a much greater advance in 出econsumer 
price index (plus 78%) but a much mo目 modestincrease in the 
index of prices of export goods (plus 8%）ー
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dollar and thus led inevitably to the second Ameri田ndevaluation 
The配condbasic change which affected the mternational position 
of the dollar was the return of gene四lcurrency convertibility. For 
n田rlya de田deafter the close of World War I most currencies 
were not freely convertible The American dollar, on the other hand, 
could r田di!ybe converted into any other currency or into gold. 
Dunng the decade of the 1950s, however, although most currencies. 
other than the dollar were not freely convertible mto gold, they 
were readily convertible mto each other. Indeed, one of the major 
goals of American economic foreign policy was the restoration of free 
convert1b1hty of currencies. But, 1ronically, this worked to the 
disadvantage of the United States because it enabled persons to hold 
their liquid funds in the currencies of the countries having the high-
est short term interest rates Thrn led to mevitable“hot money"・ 
flows. 
There is a third factor which should be considered, though at 
this point it is impossible to support it with as much empirical 
evidence as田nbe provided for the two previous points目 The
possibility remams, however, that the frequent devaluat10ns of al 
currencies other than the dollar m the penod between the close of 
World War I and the end of 1970 were too severe and as a result 
left the dollar relatively over valued The m1t阻lexchange rates 
submitted by most countries to the Internat10nal Monetary Fund 
when it began its operations in 1947 were essentially those which 
had obtained at the beginning of World War I. From 1947 until 
the end of 1970 there were over 200 devaluations of the various. 
currencies of the world " Thus at the same time that the econo-
mies of other countries were becoming competitive vis-a-vis the 
American economy the value of the American dollar relative to 
these other currencies was rising. This made it difficult for the 
7) Richard N. Cooper, CURRENCY DEVALUATION IN DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES, Princeton, N J , International Finance Section of Prin-
cetan University, 1971. p. 3 
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Umted States to export，曲目erfor the United States to import. 
There were world ・wide devaluations in 1949, for example, that had 
the effect of reducing the value of most currenロesof the world by 
over 30% in their relat10n to the dollar Except for. West Germany 
and Japan, most of the other major currenc1田 ofthe world have 
been devalued once or more smce then Thus, Gr田tBritain deva • 
lued by 14. 4% in 1967. France devalued by 17目5%in 1958 and by 
12. 2% in 1969. 
It is possible, of cource, that the extensive devaluations of 1949 
had only reflected国sicchanges which should already have been 
taken mto cons1derat10n m establishing the initial IMF panties m 
1947 At that time most countries dehb目前elywanted to over 
value their currencies. Since they had been devastated by war they 
were in no position句 exportmerchandise in any event, and an over 
valued currency could do no further damage to their export trade. 
They were desperately in need of imports for basic necessities and 
for reconstruction needs. Consequently they welcomed the stimulus 
which an over valued currency would give to their volume of im -
ports Furthermore, their bitter experiences with price inflation 
during and following World Wars I and I made them f田rthe 
possible inflationary effects of currency devaluation. This line of 
argument sug耳目tsthat the extensive devaluations of 1949 only bro・ 
ught exchar習erates to what might have been considered more 
realistic initial parities in 1947. Although the Japanese yen has not 
been devalued since 1949 the parity 〔￥360to the dollar) which 
、四sestablished at that time gave a somewhat lower value to the 
yen th叩 therate of ¥330 350 which many observers had expected 
on the basis of the Bank of Japan’s wholesale price mdex目的
The American dollar, however, got mto trouble not only because 
of economic forces gomg on outside the Umted States, but also be 
回 useof developments within the United States目 The四rmngsof 
8) T. M. F. Adams, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF MODERN JAPAN, 
Tokyo, Research, 1964, p. 204. 
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the United States on its current account (merchandise trade) pro・ 
gressively became madequate to finance American expenditures on 
capital and g目前 accounts. Three specific items江田ybe noted・ 
(1〕Americancapital investments abroad ；〔2) American foreign 
aid；田d ( 3) American mihtary expenditures abroad. Each of 
these will now be considered in turn. 
(1〕Americancapital investments abroad from 1950 through 1971 
are estimated to be a net amount of $71 billion目 Theseinvestments 
have not always been welcomed by tbe governments of the country 
in which they were made. Some (especially F四nceand Canada) 
expressed the fear that American capital was becoming too dominant 
in their economies. Regardless of the attitudes taken toward long-
term United States capital exports by the countries receiving the 
capital, 1t is hard to make a convincmg田町 toshow that United 
States capital exports have actually constituted a drain on the Uni -
ted States balance of payments An export of capital is, of田町田，
a debit on the balance of payments. Much of this investment, 
however, was in the form of direct investments These direct 
investments usually resulted m substantial merchandise exports (a 
credit item〕m the y田rin which they were niade. In subsequent 
years there would beヒontinuedcredits to the American balance of 
paym田 tsarising from the profits stemming from these investments. 
In fact, we must四 1sethe quest10n of whether there田nbe any long 
term solution to the ・Ameri田nbalance of payments problem until 
it is recogmzed by both Amen田nsand non-Americans that the 
r日ultof the large volume of American capital mvested overs田s
should be a merchandise balance for the United States which 1s 
normally in a def1c1t. In this way it would resemble the position 
of Great Britain in the late 19th and田rly20th centuries. The shift 
m the United States merchandise balance of trade m 1971 and 1972, 
though dramatic for its suddenness and too large in quantity, n国Y
actually be regarded as a more“nornial”state of affairs than the 
persistent merchandise t回desurpluses of the several decades that 
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preceded it By exportmg merchandise to the Umted Stat田 other
countries can service their Jong term debt to the Umted States 
(2〕Americaneconomic aid abroad, though substantial, has also 
not necessarily been a net drain on the United States balance of 
payments. In rec目立 Y田rsmost of this aid has been “tied.” That 
is, recipients of the aid have been obligated to spend the funds in 
the United Stat田 Thusthe aid, a debit to the American balance 
of payments, 1s exactly counterbalanced by merchandise exports, a 
credit item. It is conceivable, of cours鳥 thatin the absence of the 
aid the countries receiving the aid would have purchased the pro-
duct m the Umted Stat田 Inother words, they would have used 
their own supphes of foreign exchange rather than the credits the 
United States supplied under the aid program. To the extent that 
this happens the aid may have served to reduce the volume of 
“norrr祖l”exports. On the other hand, it also seems reasonable to 
argue tbat if the aid has served a useful economic purpose in the 
recipient country it will probably have assisted m the economic de-
velopment of that country. In the long run mutually profitable 
trade should develop between the aid granting and aid receiving 
countries as a result of this economic development. Furthermore, 
much of the aid that the United States has given in recent y回目
has been in the form of loans阻 therthan grants. Although such 
aid constitutes a debit to the American balance of payments wh印
the aid is granted there will be a correspondmg credit when the aid 
is repaid. 
〔3〕Americanmihtary expend1tur＜田 abroad are quant1tat1vely 
large They are also quahtitatively different than the other two 
categories which have been iust considered Capital investments and 
foreign economic aid probably do not constitute a serious burden on 
the American balance of payments m the short run目 Theycertamly 
constitute a net credit in the long run. Military expenditures, how-
ever, repr四回tan almost total loss to the balance of payments 
both in the short and the long run. The Pentagon has followed “Buy 
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American" regulations that have become mcreasingly strmgent To 
conserve American foreign exchange military supplies purchased by 
the Pentagon must be secured from American suppliers, unless they 
国nbe bought abroad at more than 50% lesser price. This gives 
rise to the anomalous situation that the American soldiers in Ger・ 
many have to eat “ham sandwich自由ownm from Washington！” Fur-
thermore, many American military expenditures are for personnel 
costs. In this way the productive powers of American labor have 
been used for d田tructivepurposes rather than加 crea怯 usefulgo-
ods. This has undoubtedly contributed to in自ationarypressures in 
the Umted States which have made American goods less compet1 • 
tive in world markets. Similarly the American manufacture of 
munitions has used s田.rceproductive r田ourcesfor destructive pur-
poses and thus also has contributed to American p口cein自ation. At 
the same time there has been no correspondmg mcr•白羽田 the pro-
ductive capacities of the countries where these munitions have been 
used. Indeed, the economies of co凹 tnessuch as Vietnam have al 
but been destroyed by American military・ activity there.幻
President Nixon, in announcing the February 1973 devaluation of 
10% is reported to have said that he is not sure that the devaluation 
of the dollar will be adequate to bring the American foreign ac-
counts into balance. He suggested that the Umted States might also 
have to impose higher tariff barriers on American imports. The 
9〕 Acredit which American military operations have provided to the 
United S回tesbalance of payments arises from the large scale exp町ts
of United States military hardware . much of it to countnes which 
desperately needed to use their foreign exchange for more productive 
purposes These exports increased from approximately $ 250 million a 
year in the 1950s to $1 O billion m 1961 and to S 3 4 billion in 1971. 
(NEW YORK TIMES, February 25, 1973.〕Inpart they stemmed fro皿
the comparative advantage enjoyed by the American manufacture of 
arms which arose from heavy United States government subsid1zat10n 
of military research. In part they may have arisen from what Pnme 
Mimster W ison once called “American high pressure salesmanship in 
selling arms.”But I fear that they contributed to international tensions 
rather than to peaceful economic development 
9 
fact that he levied a 10% surcharge on imports from August to 
December 1971 would indicate that this. is no empty threat. 
But the danger is that the hard work that the United States has 
done in the past 40 years to build up freer international trade may 
al come to国 ughtif the United States starts四isingthe barriers 
now The g相官 oftrade barriers is a game tbat al田nplay. Each 
nati回目nraise barriers against田 chother nation. The 1930s, when 
this game was played m dead回目est,demonstrated clearly tbat it 
is a game which al players田nlose. Indeed, the rising trade 
barriers of the 1930s were an impor回目白useof World War I. 
President Nixon has shown gr白 tcourage〔althoughm my mmd 
mistaken iudgement) in cuttmg down domestic governmen回lspend-
ing prog四mswhich he regards as inflationary. He would make far 
gr田 terprogress m the w町 againstinflatmn if he would agree to 
cut dow羽田巡回ryexp回ditureswhich are far more in自auonary
In August 1971 when the United States first took steps to meet 
the dollar crisis Pr田迫田tNixon acted unilaterally. He apparently did 
not consult with the other members of the Group of Ten before he 
announced the end of dollar convertibihty mto gold This unilateral 
actmn created g目.vepoliti田1problems in• Japan where it followed 
so closely another unilateral American decision-the“ping pong'’ 
diplomacy leading to the Nixon-Chou talks m Pekmg last y田 r.
Understandably, the Japanese refer to these acts as the “Nixon 
shock ”In 1973, on the other hand, there apparently was prior 
consultation. United States Treasury Unders配retaryPaul Volek町
田meto Japan in secret to confer with Japanese officials prior t。
the time of the recent Umted States action This is a much better 
way to conduct international monetary cooperation目
But the American devaluation is stil bitter medicme for the 
Japanese to take. Because it is designed to increase American ex-
ports and reduce imports it wil, if effective, do the precise oppo-
site for Japan The Japanese are afraid that their booming economy 
will be hurt because there will be unemployment in their export 
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industries. A flood of American imports will also take the jobs of 
people of Japan who are now en且：agedm the production of these 
“import substitution" products. Americans would well be advised 
to 目立国insensitive to the fact that foreign trade is more important 
to the Japanese economy than to the American economy. Perhaps, 
however, Japan should take immediate steps to increase its gross 
national product in the future, not so much by incr田smgits exports 
as by devotmg more of its resources to improving the quality of life 
in Japan. To an outsider at 1田st, gr田terJapanese governmental 
expenditures for pollution control and for social services would seem 
to be highly important. 
But the Umted States must fmd a better way to solve the Ame-
ncan balance of payments problem than to export the problem to 
Japan. I am convmced that the most effective way that America 
回 ndo this is to reduce drastically its inflated uneconomic expend-
itures for military purposes. The world’s strongest currencies to-
day are the Japanese yen and the German mark. It is no accident 
that this is so. Both of these countnes were defeated in war and 
were prevented by the te四国 ofpeace from engagmg in extensive 
military operations. How long will it take America to learn from 
this clear object lesson? 
Americans have though that they can have both思msand butter an 
almighty mihtary machine and an almighty dal!ar as well. The 
events of February 1973 should clearly tel the United States that 
1t can not have both. It must choose. 
The author wishes to express his deep gratitude to Mr Motohide Yoshi-
kawa who prepared the Japanese summary of this article. 
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全能なるドルの没落：論争的小論
＜抄＞
カーノレ・クライダー
現代経済学は科学性を主張する余り，ややもすると現実問題との関わP
が薄くなりがちである。しかし経済学の伝統は，その時代の現実問題を議
論するという論争的性格を有するものであった。スミス，マルクス，ケイ
yズは全て上記伝統の流れを汲んでいる。この小論もそのような経済学の
伝統の上に立つものである。
私が日本を離れていた16年の聞にドルの地位は大きく変った。私が日本
を去った1956年当時の国際通貨の最大の問題は「ドル不足」であった。し
かしそのドルは， 1971～73年の二度に宣り切下げられた。ドルのこのよう
な国際的地位の変化は何故生じたのか。この聞いに答えるのが本論文の巨
的である。
それには三つの原因が考えられよう。その最も重要と思われるものは，
西ヨーロッパと日本経済の戦後における目覚ましい復興である。次に一般
通貨の交換性回復を第二の原因として挙げることが出来る。第三の原因と
考えられるのは，第二次大戦後1970年末に至る期聞の合計200回を超す世
界の通貨切下げにより， ドノレが相対的に過大評価されるようになったとい
う事である。フEもこれに対しては現時点では先の二つの要因程の実証的裏
付けを与えられない。
しかしドルの苦難はアメリカ外部の経済力に原因するのみならず，アメ
リヵ内部での動きにも起因している。つまりアメリカの経常収支の収入
が，資本並びに贈与収支での支出を次第に賄い切れなくなったという事で
ある。それについては，（1）海外投資，（2）海外経済援助，（3）海外軍事支出の
三項目が注目されよう。このうち（1),(2）は必ずしも国際収支上の流出を形
成するものではなかった。しかしωは量的に大であり，しかも先の二項目
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とは質的に異なっている。更に軍事支出はアメロヵの労働力が破壊目的に
使用されている点，及ひ静兵器製造が希少な資源を破壊目的に使っている点
でアメリカ園内のインフレ圧力となっている。従ってアメリカの国際収支
改善の最も効果的方法は，海外軍事支出を大幅に削減する事である。アメ
リカは今まで銃とバター，即ち全能の軍事兵器と全能のドノレの荷方を持ち
得ると思ってきた。しかし1973年2月の出来事は，アメ Hカが今やそのど
ちらか一方を選択せねばならない事を教えている。
